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When Is a Catholic Doing Legal Theory Doing 
“Catholic Legal Theory?” 
Robert K. Vischer∗ 
It is important at the outset to note the limits of this Essay: pro-
viding a comprehensive overview of Catholic legal theory is such a 
formidable mountain that I disclaim any intention to embark on that 
climb.  It is practically impossible for one person to capture the whole 
field given its breadth, depth, and history.  On the question of 
breadth, there are scholarly journals devoted in substantial part to 
the development of Catholic legal theory,
1
 blogs like Mirror of Jus-
tice,
2
 anthologies of Catholic legal theory,
3
 an annual conference on 
Catholic legal theory,
4
 and hundreds of journal articles, not to men-
tion a robust pedagogical dimension, with an increasing number of 
law schools offering courses that incorporate significant themes from 
the Catholic intellectual tradition.  As for depth, the field is inescapa-
bly interdisciplinary and remarkably sophisticated.  Law professors 
tend to be professional dabblers, and though I think we are well posi-
tioned to play a valuable role in making philosophical and theologi-
cal concepts more practically accessible by tracing their implications 
for law, we need to be careful not to force two millennia worth of ref-
lection and thought into our easy and occasionally superficial legal 
concepts and categories.  And obviously, the history of the Catholic 
 
 ∗ Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas Law School (Minnesota).  Thanks to 
Zachary Calo, Lisa Schiltz, Susan Stabile, and Amy Uelmen for comments on earlier 
drafts of this Essay.  The Essay is based on a talk given at the conference Religious 
Legal Theory: The State of the Field, held at Seton Hall University School of Law in 
November 2009.  The portions of the Essay discussing conscience—as opposed to the 
methodological framework of “Catholic legal theory”—are taken from my book, 
CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD: RECLAIMING THE SPACE BETWEEN PERSON AND 
STATE (2010). 
 1 For example, such journals include Villanova University’s Journal of Catholic So-
cial Thought and St. John’s University School of Law’s Journal of Catholic Legal Studies. 
 2 See Mirror of Justice, www.mirrorofjustice.blogs.com (last visited Apr. 5, 2010).  
 3 See, e.g., RECOVERING SELF-EVIDENT TRUTHS: CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVES ON 
AMERICAN LAW (Michael A. Scaperlanda & Teresa Stanton Collett eds., 2007). 
 4  The Conference on Catholic Legal Thought convenes at a different Catholic 
law school each June. 
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legal theory project is not easily summarized—the project among 
American law professors is of fairly recent vintage, but the roster of 
Catholic legal theorists includes, of course, Thomas Aquinas, Augus-
tine, the Apostle Paul, and arguably even Aristotle. 
As such, I will not even purport to be the final or exhaustive 
word on the state of Catholic legal theory.  Any authentic insight I 
can provide will most likely be more personal, deriving from my own 
efforts to contribute to the Catholic legal theory project.  I think I can 
best capture the aspirations and challenges of Catholic legal theory 
methodologies by sharing my own experience with those aspirations 
and challenges.  Hopefully my comments will resonate with others 
engaged in the project and will shed a bit of light on the project for 
those who are not so engaged. 
My experience working on my book, Conscience and the Common 
Good, provides a synopsis of my experience with Catholic legal theory.  
To get a sense of how I approach Catholic legal theory, you have to 
get a sense of the book, so please bear with me.  My book’s central 
claim is that our law’s individualized understanding of conscience 
threatens the full flourishing of conscience, which is relational in na-
ture.  Americans have traditionally embraced the liberty of con-
science as an essential limitation on state power, but this understand-
ing has not been much help in resolving an expanding range of 
conscience claims in which the individual is opposed not by the state 
but by the similarly conscience-driven claims of other individuals and 
groups.  As a bulwark against state power, a robust right of conscience 
is indispensable.  As a trump card that empowers individuals to shut 
down the moral claims of other marketplace actors, a right of con-
science becomes significantly more problematic. 
Consider one recent conscience battle in New Mexico.  Vanessa 
Willock contacted Elane Photography, a husband-and-wife photo 
agency in Albuquerque, New Mexico, through its Web site to inquire 
about photographing her same-sex commitment ceremony.
5
  Co-
owner Elaine Huguenin emailed back: “We do not photograph same-
sex weddings.  But thanks for checking out our site!”
6
  Willock filed a 
complaint with the state human rights commission, alleging a viola-
tion of the state’s public accommodations law, which covers sexual 
orientation.
7
  At the hearing, Willock testified that the email “was a 
 
 5 Morning Edition: Gay Rights, Religious Liberties: A Three-Act Story (NPR radio 
broadcast June 16, 2008), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/ 
transcript.php?storyId=91486340. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
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shock” and caused her “anger and fear.”
8
  Jonathan Huguenin ex-
plained at the hearing that they made sure that “everything that 
[they] photographed, everything [they] used [their] artistic ability 
for,” was in line with their Christian values.
9
  The commission rejected 
the photographers’ constitutional claims, found that they unlawfully 
discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation, and ordered them to 
pay attorney’s fees of nearly $7000 to Willock.
10
 
When the state moves against the individual, either foreclosing 
dissent or coercing assent to the majority’s ideals, it makes sense to 
view liberty of conscience as a legal protection that arises at the point 
of conflict between an individual’s deeply held moral or religious be-
liefs and state power.
11





 both sides in the Elane Photography case can 
wrap themselves in the mantle of conscience.  Willock acted on her 
belief in the moral legitimacy of same-sex relationships by seeking to 
solemnize her commitment with the same celebratory trappings that 
have long been part of traditional marriage ceremonies.  The Hu-
guenins provide the more straightforward conscience claim, to be 
sure, in their refusal to participate in the celebration of a relationship 
that they deem immoral.  But unlike traditional claims seeking to 
protect individuals against the state’s coercive power, both Willock 
and the Huguenins are seeking to protect their moral autonomy 
against the threat of non-state actors.  While Willock’s critics argue 
that the liberty of conscience should not be interpreted as empower-
ing individuals to force others to assist their morally contested 
projects, the Huguenins’ critics argue that liberty of conscience 
should not be interpreted as a license for marketplace providers to 
define their professional duties so as to discriminate against members 
of historically marginalized groups. 
To get a firmer grasp on why New Mexico’s resolution of this 
dispute reflects an inaccurate and dangerous understanding of con-
 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 See Brief of Respondent at 2, Willock v. Elane Photography, No. 06-12-20-0685 
(N.M. Human Rights Comm’n Feb. 20, 2008), available at http://volokh.com/ 
files/willockrespondentbrief.pdf (describing constitutional claims); Andrew Webb, 
State: It’s Discrimination; Photographer Refused to Shoot Gay Ceremony, ALBUQUERQUE J., 
Apr. 11, 2008, at A1 (discussing the commission’s decision). 
 11 See, e.g., Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 68 (1946) (“The struggle for 
religious liberty has through the centuries been an effort to accommodate the de-
mands of the State to the conscience of the individual.”). 
 12 See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
 13 See, e.g., W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
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science, we need to reclaim a dimension of the term that is discerni-
ble from its earliest usage: conscience is a set of moral truth claims 
that can be shared with others.  The dictates of conscience are de-
fined, articulated, and lived out in relationship with others.  Our con-
sciences are shaped externally, our moral convictions have sources, 
and our sense of self comes into relief through interaction with oth-
ers.  By conveying my perception of reality’s normative implications, 
my conscience makes truth claims that possess authority over con-
duct—both my own and the conduct of those who share, or come to 
share, my perception.  Conscience, by its very nature, connects a per-
son to something bigger than herself, not only because we form our 
moral convictions through interaction with the world around us, but 
also because we invest those convictions with real world authority in 
ways that are accessible, if not agreeable, to others.  This is the rela-
tional dimension of conscience. 
Cultivating and maintaining the conditions necessary for these 
relationships to thrive should be a priority for our society if we are se-
rious about freedom of conscience.  The problem today is that the 
state, in Elane Photography and other cases, pays insufficient heed to 
these relationships, effectively giving the individual customer’s con-
science a trump over the provider’s conscience through the imposi-
tion of broad nondiscrimination laws.  Increasingly, such laws appear 
aimed not simply at ensuring access to an essential good or service, 
but at enshrining nondiscrimination as a blanket requirement for 
providers’ participation in the marketplace. 
Too often, however, the response of those concerned with the 
erosion of providers’ liberty is to champion the recognition of a 
blanket right of conscience on their behalf.  They ask the law to im-
munize an individual employee’s conscience-driven marketplace 
conduct from state penalty or employer reprisal.  If an individual 
employee of a provider has the unfettered legal right to make her 
own decisions about the morally contested goods and services she will 
provide, it becomes more difficult for institutions to create and main-
tain their own distinct moral identities.  For example, does the relent-
less focus on giving individual pharmacists rights of conscience to be 
deployed against their employers stand in tension with a discernible 




 14 See Rob Stein, “Pro-Life” Drugstores Market Beliefs; No Contraceptives for Chantilly 
Shop, WASH. POST, June 16, 2008, at A1.  Not all of these drugstores have proven to be 
economically viable.  See Petula Dvorak, Pharmacy with Moral Convictions Found Few 
Clients, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2010, at B1. 
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Wedding photographers and pharmacists are the tip of a very 
large iceberg.  Participants in an exploding array of debates over the 
provision of goods and services in our society tend to invoke con-
science as a freestanding, absolute value without acknowledging—
much less articulating—the real-world relationships and associational 
ties that empower individuals to live out the dictates of conscience.  
Besides the battle in the pharmacy, consumer-provider conscience 
battles have also erupted over a Christian physician’s refusal to pro-
vide reproductive assistance to a patient because she is a lesbian or is 
not married,
15
 Muslim taxi drivers’ refusal to transport passengers 
carrying alcohol,
16
 Muslim cashiers’ refusal to handle pork products,
17
 
and a Catholic lawyer’s unsuccessful effort to decline a court ap-
pointment to represent a minor seeking an abortion,
18
 to name just a 
few. 
Other legal challenges have taken aim more directly at an organ-
ization’s moral identity, particularly its religious identity, based on 
perceived threats to the moral autonomy of individual employees or 
customers.  EHarmony, a leading dating Web site founded by an 
evangelical Christian, was forced via litigation to begin offering mat-
chmaking services for same-sex relationships.
19
  State universities have 
revoked recognition of Christian student groups that exclude non-
Christians or non-celibate homosexuals;
20
 legislatures in California 
and New York have forced Catholic Charities to cover the cost of con-
 
 15 See N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. San Diego County Superior 
Court, 189 P.3d 959, 967–68 (Cal. 2008) (holding that religious liberty and free 
speech rights did not exempt physicians from complying with state prohibition 
against sexual orientation discrimination); Eithne Donnellan, Infertility Treatment Re-
fusal Led to Inquiry, IRISH TIMES (Dublin, Ir.), Apr. 15, 2010, at 3 (reporting on discip-
linary proceedings against Catholic physician who limited fertility treatments to mar-
ried couples). 
 16 See Curt Brown, Cabbies Ordered to Pick up All Riders, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis, 
Minn.), Apr. 17, 2007, at 1A. 
 17 See Chris Serres & Matt McKinney, Target Is Transferring Cashiers Who Avoid Pork, 
STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis, Minn.), Mar. 17, 2007, at 1A. 
 18 See Teresa Stanton Collett, Professional Versus Moral Duty: Accepting Appointments 
in Unjust Civil Cases, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 635, 640–48 (1997) 
 19 See Victoria Kim, EHarmony Settles Suit Brought by Gays and Lesbians, L.A. TIMES, 
Jan. 27, 2010, at A9. 
 20  See Adam Liptak, Rights and Religion Clash in Court Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 
2009, at A24 (“The Supreme Court on Monday agreed to hear an appeal from a 
Christian student group that had been denied recognition by a public law school in 
California for excluding homosexuals and nonbelievers.”). 
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traceptives for employees;
21
 and the Massachusetts legislature re-
quired Catholic Charities to place children with same-sex couples as a 
condition of maintaining its license to perform adoption services.
22
  
The modern inclination is to presume that the cause of conscience is 
represented by the individuals whose own exercise of conscience may 
by burdened by an organization’s distinctive moral identity.  Little at-
tention is paid to the conscience-facilitating function of the organiza-
tions themselves. 
These individualized conceptions of conscience—whether es-
poused by the consumer or the provider—do not hold much promise 
for resolving the new wave of conscience battles because they over-
look the relationships that are key to conscience’s long-term flourish-
ing.  The state would more prudently support the liberty of con-
science by stepping back from the winner-take-all language of rights 
talk and allowing Vanessa Willock and the Huguenins to live out their 
convictions in the marketplace.  Assuming that other wedding photo-
graphers are willing and able to shoot a same-sex commitment cere-
mony, the state should leave the Huguenins to answer to the custom-
er, not the state, and allow customers to utilize market power to 
contest (or embrace) the moral norms of their choosing.  Rather 
than making all photography agencies morally fungible via state 
edict, the market allows the flourishing of plural moral norms in the 
provision of these services.  At the same time, if the Huguenins can-
not find market support for their agency’s moral claims, they would 
not have an absolute right to force other agencies to hire them and 
accommodate their claims of conscience.  They should have the free-
dom to create an economically viable agency with a distinct moral 
identity; they should not have the authority to hinder the cultivation 
of another agency’s conflicting moral identity.  Put differently, the 
scope of legal intervention necessary to dismantle Jim Crow should 
not serve as the template for which we reflexively reach in our moral 
contests today.  The remedy of the Civil Rights Act fit the problem 
posed by a society hard-wired for the subjugation and exclusion of 
African Americans.  The marginalization and division accompanying 
today’s moral contests do not, in my view, warrant a similar legal re-
sponse given the conscience-squelching fallout of such massive state 
intrusion into the landscape of morally distinct institutions. 
 
 21 See Catholic Charities of Sacramento v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004) 
(upholding California law); Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 
N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 2006) (upholding New York law). 
 22 See Patricia Wen, Catholic Charities Stuns State, Ends Adoptions, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Mar. 11, 2006, at A1. 
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Recently, I was laying out these arguments in a conversation with 
the religion reporter for a national newspaper.  We talked for a half-
hour about my thesis and its policy implications, including my disa-
greement with the cases involving Catholic Charities.  Then the re-
porter asked, “So are you Catholic?” and I hesitated.  I am certainly 
not embarrassed about being Catholic, but I had this gnawing sense 
of, “Uh-oh, where is this headed?”  And then she asked the follow-up: 
“Is that why you reached the conclusions you reached?” 
I did not really want to answer that question.  Of course my 
Catholic identity shaped my conclusions, but admitting that seemed 
like it would compromise my scholarly integrity in her eyes, or so I as-
sumed.  I did not want her to think that I figured out the policy out-
comes I needed to achieve as a Catholic and then rigged my theoreti-
cal framework accordingly.  So the question I have to grapple with is 
this: what does it mean for me to be a Catholic doing legal theory, 
even when I am not trying to do “Catholic legal theory”? 
Answering that question requires me to ask some methodologi-
cal questions about Catholic legal theory.  There are a couple of dif-
ferent ways to get at this.  First, I would distinguish between Catholic 
legal theory that describes and Catholic legal theory that proclaims.  
Second, I would distinguish between Catholic legal theory that is 
prophetic and Catholic legal theory that is pragmatic.  These distinc-
tions are not rigid or absolute, of course, but they do describe mea-
ningful differences, and being clear about those differences can help 
us understand what it means—and equally important, what it does 
not mean—to be engaged in Catholic legal theory.  In my own work 
as a Catholic legal theorist, I might be describing a tradition, I might 
be proclaiming its truth, I might be speaking prophetically to power, 
or I might be speaking pragmatically about reasonably debatable me-
thods by which to cultivate the common good.  At different points, if 
I want to contribute to the full flowering of our project, I hope that I 
do all of these. 
To take the first category, sometimes a Catholic legal theorist is 
essentially standing outside the tradition, describing it.  In my book, I 
do this in the section that traces the intellectual history of conscience, 
showing how conscience has been understood through most of the 
Christian tradition as moral knowledge that can be shared.  At 
around the time Augustine was writing, Jerome introduced the con-
cept of “synderesis” to the discussion of conscience (though his dis-
covery of the new term was possibly the result of an error in transcrip-
tion).  While “conscientia” was used to refer to the person’s 
application of moral knowledge to conduct, Jerome used synderesis 
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to designate the person’s apprehension of moral knowledge itself.  In 
his commentary on the prophet Ezekiel, Jerome analyzed Ezekiel’s 
vision of four  beings—a man, a lion, an ox, and an eagle—and men-
tions other writers’ interpretations of the vision: 
These writers interpret the vision in terms of Plato’s theory of the 
three elements of the soul.  There are Reason, Spirit, and Desire; 
to these correspond respectively the man, the lion, and the ox.  
Now, above these three was the eagle; so in the soul, they say, 
above the other three elements and beyond them is a fourth, 
which the Greeks call synderesis.  This is that spark of conscience 
which was not quenched even in the heart of Cain, when he was 
driven out of paradise.  This it is that makes us, too, feel our sin-
fulness when we are overcome by evil Desire or unbridled Spirit, 
or deceived by sham Reason.  It is natural to identify synderesis 
with the eagle, since it is distinct from the other three elements 
and corrects them when they err.
23
 
Note that Jerome did not contend that synderesis automatically or 
unfailingly corrects the erroneous operation of reason, spirit, and de-
sire.  He cautions that “in some men we see this conscience overth-
rown and displaced; they have no sense of guilt or shame for their 
sins,” and they “deserve the rebuke, ‘Still never a blush on thy harlot’s 
brow.’”
24
  Conscience, in early Christian understandings, connected a 
person to objective (divine) truth, but its perception of that truth 
could be mistaken. 
Thomas Aquinas went further, asserting that “conscience is nei-
ther a faculty nor a habit, but an act: the act of applying knowledge to 
conduct.”
25
  But conscience is not simply the exercise of the will—it is 
in dialogue with the will, though the will should obey its commands.  
Like other Scholastics, Aquinas held that the will must be judged by 
the good as presented by reason, not by the good as it actually exists.
26
  
He wrote that “every act of will against reason, whether in the right or 
in the wrong, is always bad.”
27
  In other words, according to Aquinas, 
every dictate of conscience is binding, regardless of its truth or falsity. 
 
 23 ERIC D’ARCY, CONSCIENCE AND ITS RIGHT TO FREEDOM 16–17 (1961) (quoting St. 
Jerome, Commentarium in Ezechielem, in 25 PATROLOGIAE CURSUS COMPLETUS 15, 22 
(J.P. Migne ed., Venit Apud Editorem 1845) (n.d.) (internal citations omitted). 
 24 Id. at 17 (quoting St. Jerome, Commentarium in Ezechielem, in 25 PATROLOGIAE 
CURSUS COMPLETUS 15, 22 (J.P. Migne ed., Venit Apud Editorem 1845) (n.d.) (quot-
ing Jeremiah 3:3)). 
 25 Id. at 45. 
 26 Id. at 87–88. 
 27 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, IaIIae, ques. 19, art. 5, at 63 (Thomas 
Gilby trans., Blackfriars 1966) (n.d.). 
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The gap between the moral law and a person’s application of the 
moral law—a gap which can widen or narrow over time—helps clarify 
what is lacking when we characterize conscience as a self-contained 
moral code.  Conscience is subject to continual shaping by the per-
son’s experience of, and exposure to, sources of moral influence.  In 
other words, the modern conception of conscience as a mysterious 
and inaccessible “black box” is less relational than conscience as part 
of an ongoing dialogue that is neither static nor self-contained.  The 
Christian tradition of conscience can help us understand the external 
orientation of conscience, which can in turn show us why the liberty 
of conscience must be a social liberty.  For this analysis, the fact that I 
am Catholic is not all that relevant to my analysis; I am just hopefully 
getting the history right.  Participants in the Catholic legal theory 
project may have greater motivation than other scholars to devote 
sustained attention to the portrayal of the Catholic tradition and its 
contributions to law, and the community of Catholic legal scholars 
may provide a more supportive venue for ensuring the accuracy of 
the descriptive work.  But obviously this type of scholarship is not li-
mited to the project’s participants. 
Another possibility, though, is that my scholarship leads me to 
stand within the Catholic tradition, not simply describing its devel-
opment, but proclaiming its truth.  One foundational claim through-
out my book regards the social nature of the human person.  If I just 
say, “Well, some people say that the human person is inherently so-
cial,” that cannot really carry my thesis.  I need to own it.  This sort of 
scholarship has the potential to alienate readers, especially if my 
proclamation explicitly or implicitly appeals to the authority of my re-
ligious tradition for its persuasive power.  For example, in my book I 
cite Pope Benedict XVI in order to describe the progression of Cath-
olic thinking on a particular issue, but I am more hesitant to cite the 
pope when I am seeking to persuade the reader of the truth of the 
matter asserted.  This is where the Catholic legal theory project en-
counters a sort of resistance that may be more pronounced than the 
resistance encountered by our Jewish, Protestant, and Muslim friends: 
in pursuing truth, we are also accountable to a fairly clear line of hu-
man authority, not just the authority of sacred texts.
28
 
This was undoubtedly a factor in my hesitation to the reporter’s 
question, and why I could not just say, “Well, everyone is shaped by 
some perspective.”  There is something about the Catholic perspec-
 
 28 I realize that questions regarding the clarity of the authority wielded by the 
Church are themselves much disputed by Catholic legal theorists. 
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tive that does not quite fit: a real scholar is not supposed to take 
marching orders from anyone, much less from a person at the head 
of a church spouting, to put it charitably from the secular academic 
perspective, “counter-cultural” views.  Now I may believe that the 
pope says X because X is true, but it is easy for readers (and students 
in my classes) to dismiss my citation on the ground that I think X is 
true because the pope is saying it, and even more provocatively, that I 
would feel restrained from denying X even if I did not believe it was 
true because the pope said it was true.  So in my own work developing 
Catholic legal theory, I need to proclaim the underlying ideas, not 
the authoritative packaging in which the ideas are often found.  It is 
important to build bridges between the Catholic worldview and those 
who stand outside the tradition. 
There are many bridge-building figures from within the Catholic 
tradition, such as the philosopher Charles Taylor.  Taylor’s formida-
ble intellectual legacy is built on a Catholic understanding of the 
human person, but his profound insights into the human condition 
flow from the depth of his simultaneous immersion in Catholic and 
modern social narratives.  Taylor does not “circle the wagons” against 
a hostile secular culture; he opens himself (and his readers) to learn-
ing from secular culture without marginalizing the relevance of his 
own worldview, which in many ways runs counter to that culture.  For 
my purposes, Taylor’s work is essential for drawing out the relation-
ship between personal identity and other selves.  Taylor shows that 
the self is inescapably relational because “[a] self can never be de-
scribed without reference to those who surround it.”
29
  Human life is 
dialogical in that we can only understand ourselves and acquire an 
identity via languages of self-expression, but we enter into these lan-
guages only in exchange with others.
30
  It is not simply that a person is 
strongly attached to a particular moral framework; the framework is 
the horizon against which a person is able to make more particular 
moral judgments, locating herself within the everyday world.  Without 
such a framework, a person “wouldn’t know anymore, for an impor-
tant range of questions, what the significance of things was for 
them.”
31
  The individual’s articulation of a framework is itself deeply 
relational.  Taylor points out that “I can identify my identity only 
 
 29 CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY 
35 (1989). 
 30 See CHARLES TAYLOR, THE ETHICS OF AUTHENTICITY 32–33 (1991) (“No one ac-
quires the languages needed for self-definition on their own.”). 
 31 TAYLOR, supra note 29, at 27. 
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against the background of things that matter,”
32
 which inescapably 
draws a person outside herself.  American law reflects the truth that 
conscience is at the core of personal identity, but the law too often 
fails to reflect the additional truth that the core of personal identity is 
inescapably relational. 
The most profound insights from within the Catholic tradition 
are not exclusive to the Catholic tradition because they express fun-
damental human truths.  Relying on work from outside the tradition 
can bring this home.  For example, Kwame Anthony Appiah notes 
that “part of the material that we are responding to in shaping our 
selves is not within us but outside us, out there in the social world.”
33
  
And significantly, our universe of “what matters” will not always be 
products of conscious individual choice.  This is the point Michael 
Sandel makes by asking, 
Are we as moral agents bound only by the ends and roles we 
choose for ourselves, or can we sometimes be obligated to fulfill 
certain ends we have not chosen—ends given by nature or God, 




No matter how individualist our moral framework might be, the 
process of articulating that framework is not—and cannot be—
successfully undertaken by the individual in a vacuum.  Making sense 
of ourselves requires looking beyond ourselves.  As a constitutive 
element of self-identity, conscience is relational. 
So when I, as a scholar, proclaim truths found within my faith 
tradition, I need not put up walls between me and my non-Catholic 
readers.  I should be expanding the conversation, not narrowing it.  
Catholic legal theory is not self-contained or inward gazing.  Big “C” 
Catholic is small “c” catholic, affirming truth and goodness whatever 
its source.  This is how I think about the natural law.  I do not spend 
much time writing expressly about natural law, and I fear that, on 
some issues, the broader premises from which more particular policy 
conclusions proceed are themselves so deeply contested that invoca-
tions of “the natural law” seem to shed more heat than light.  The 
ability of natural law arguments to gain traction in our political and 
legal discourse is limited, and those limits must be part of our think-
ing about how the arguments are most effectively utilized.  I do be-
lieve that the natural law can help us articulate moral truths that we 
 
 32 TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 40. 
 33 KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE ETHICS OF IDENTITY 21 (2005). 
 34 MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 186–87 (2d ed. 1998). 
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know to be true but which often go ignored.  In other words, refer-
ences to the natural law may not always convince people of truths 
they deny, but they may force people to stop ignoring truths they 
cannot deny, such as the social nature of the human person. 
This leads to the second set of categories one sees in the metho-
dology of Catholic legal theory: am I speaking prophetically or prac-
tically?  Or is it possible to do both?  Speaking prophetically, making 
truth claims to power—on the sanctity of unborn life, for example, or 
on the nature of marriage, or on health care as a right rather than a 
privilege, or on the dignity of the immigrant, or on the preferential 
option for the poor.  There are lots of examples where Catholic legal 
theory stakes out principles that run counter to society’s prevailing 
judgment.  In my book, I am speaking a truth about human flourish-
ing to the emerging legal order—that the liberty of conscience is an 
important and natural right, and that a strictly individualized liberty 
of conscience is missing much of what is important about conscience. 
But we also should have capacity to speak prophetically to the re-
ligious order.  If I want to reframe the way society thinks about the li-
berty of conscience, I cannot be afraid of including my own religious 
community in my criticism.  Occasionally I hear arguments from 
Catholics in favor of conscience protection based on the assertion 
that the underlying claim comports with the natural law.  That argu-
ment is a nonstarter politically, and it is also inconsistent with much 
of the Catholic intellectual tradition’s understanding of conscience.  
A person may be culpable for improperly forming her conscience, 
but not for following the dictates of that improperly formed con-
science.  If Catholics want to secure freedom for Catholic Charities, 
for example, to resist laws compelling the provision of contraceptives 
or the placement of children with same-sex couples, the argument 
cannot be that “these institutional claims are the products of well-
formed consciences.”  That argument prevails only as long as the 
claims themselves prevail politically (in which case there would be no 
need for a conscience-based exemption).  The whole point is that, on 
an expanding variety of issues, the majority of citizens have decided 
that consciences reflecting traditional natural law teaching are not 
well formed.  Yes, they may be “well formed” according to our inter-
pretation of the natural law, but the claim for an exemption does not 
aim at persuading the legislature to embrace the “well formed” 
judgment as a normative proposition, but to defer to the claimant’s 
own understanding of “well formed.”  
Or to restate a message I have expressed to the pro-life commu-
nity: is your commitment to conscience really about conscience, or is 
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it just new packaging for the same arguments about abortion?  If our 
commitment to conscience only extends to the issues we lost political-
ly and is not anchored to a broader framework, the other side can 
easily extinguish our conscience claims when they do not share our 
view on the importance of a specific issue.  
Catholic legal theorists cannot simply speak prophetically; we 
must also speak practically.  The practical dimension is where we have 
struggled at times to know what to say.  For example, what should a 
post-Roe v. Wade35 legal regime look like?  How should the law respect 
the dignity of gays and lesbians?  If health care is a right, who has the 
corresponding duty to provide it, and if resources are limited, then 
how do we pay for that right?  The fact that an issue is subject to pru-
dential judgment does not mean that the issue is less important, even 
when there is room for disagreement among faithful Catholics.  Stak-
ing out broad truth claims is essential, but ignoring the thorny real-
world questions over implementing those truths makes the Catholic 
legal theory project appear otherworldly and academic.  We should 
not shirk from speaking on issues about which reasonable people 
may disagree, though in those cases, we should be careful not to por-
tray our conclusions as the only acceptable “Catholic” positions. 
In my own book, I try to take practical issues head-on.  For ex-
ample, many Catholics champion individual rights of conscience for 
employees, but I am more cautious based in part on Catholic teach-
ing about the important role institutions play in furthering the com-
mon good.  Creating space for employees’ exercise and expression of 
conscience in the workplace is important, but the efforts should not 
substitute for the parallel endeavor of constructing the corporation’s 
institutional conscience.  The corporation’s moral identity is not 
simply the sum of its parts; the corporation needs discretion to shape 
its own identity.  Under some circumstances, this will limit the con-
science-driven conduct of individual employees, but that is the price 
of the corporation’s mediating role. 
To cite another example on which reasonable Catholics can dis-
agree, I do not believe that the liberty of conscience can or should be 
limited to religiously formed consciences.  If the right of conscience 
is to mean something, the modern state is hard-pressed to exclude 
nonreligious sources of moral belief from its protection, especially in 
light of Establishment Clause concerns.  While we should hesitate to 
legitimize religiously derived claims of conscience over other types, it 
remains important not to diminish the importance of accommodat-
 
 35 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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ing religious convictions, and one effective way of doing so is to ad-
dress religious convictions specifically.  The Establishment Clause 
should not be read to foreclose the law’s treatment of religion as a 
distinct category of conscience-driven claims.  Again, Catholic legal 
scholars cannot just trumpet the liberty of conscience—we must help 
figure out how it should work in the real world, even when Catholic 
legal theory will not propose a single correct answer. 
*  *  * 
In the end, maybe my hesitation in answering the reporter’s 
question, “Are you Catholic?” is the same hesitation that I would feel 
when that question follows any substantive discussion I am having 
about issues that matter.  Perhaps my fear is that the religious label, 
especially the Catholic label, will be an easy way to pigeonhole me 
and more easily dismiss my opinions as preordained conclusions dic-
tated by the fact of my submission to an authority beyond reason, 
rendering them less authentic and even less human.  In this regard, 
my hesitation reflects my own misconception of what it means to be a 
Catholic legal scholar and about what it means to be a Catholic.  My 
faith should be the impetus to delve even more deeply into the heart 
of what it means to be human, to grapple unflinchingly with the reali-
ty of our existence.  In a real sense, Catholic legal theory exhibits 
much of the same promise and peril of my own personal faith jour-
ney.  When I use faith as an escape, when I toss off trite prayers to 
numb myself to the tragedy that unfolds around me, rather than 
praying to express and share in the depth of that grief, I am rightly 
dismissed by the grieving.  Similarly, when I use faith in my scholar-
ship as a bludgeon to wield against those who reject my worldview, or 
when I dress up my unsupported assertions as self-evident simply be-
cause they come from my faith tradition, I am rightly dismissed by 
those legal scholars who are authentically struggling with the ques-
tion of how imperfect people should govern themselves in an imper-
fect world.  The Catholic legal theory project has much to contribute 
to the legal academy, starting with the anthropological question of 
what it even means to be human.  Our contribution depends not just 
on the relevance of our answers, but also on the humanity with which 
we extend those answers. 
Of course, I wrote Conscience and the Common Good as a Catholic.  
I could not have written it any other way.  This fact should not serve 
as a conversation stopper, but as an invitation to a deeper, truer con-
versation, because Catholic legal theory is the working out in law of 
the fundamental truths comprising the human condition.  In other 
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words, Catholic legal theory is about what we, as humans, share; put 
even more starkly, it is about what we cannot help but share. 
 
